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Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
The Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller might be taken in three different
ways. First, it might be seen as a modern version of Marbury v. Madison, speaking neutrally for
the text, structure, and original understanding of the Constitution. Second, it might be seen as
analogous to Lochner v. New York, in which a majority of the Court invoked a dubious
understanding of the Constitution in order to override the democratic will. Third, it might be
taken as analogous to Griswold v. Connecticut, in which a majority of the Court, proceeding in
minimalist fashion, used the Constitution to vindicate the contemporary judgments of a national
majority. It is true that in emphasizing constitutional text and structure, the Court spoke in terms
close to those in Marbury; indeed, Heller is the most self-consciously originalist opinion in the
history of the Supreme Court. It is also true that many historians reject the Court's understanding
of the Second Amendment, making it plausible to see the ruling as a modern incarnation of
Lochner. But the timing and context of the decision suggest that Griswold is the most illuminating
analogy. In both cases, the Court spoke on behalf of the contemporary sentiment of a national
majority against a national outlier. The claimed analogy between Griswold and Heller fits well
with the fact that Heller is a narrow ruling with strong minimalist elements. No less than the right
of privacy, and notwithstanding the backward-looking nature of the Court’s opinion, the right to
have guns is likely to evolve over time through case-by-case judgments made under the influence
of contemporary social commitments.

I. Introduction
District of Columbia v. Heller1 is the most explicitly and self-consciously
originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.2 Well over two hundred years
since the framing, the Court has, for essentially the first time, interpreted a constitutional
provision with explicit, careful, and detailed reference to its original public meaning.3
It would be possible, in this light, to see Heller as a modern incarnation of
Marbury v. Madison,4 at least as that case is understood by some contemporary scholars,5
and to a considerable extent as Chief Justice John Marshall wrote it. In Marbury, the
Court also spoke on behalf of what it took to be the text, structure, and original meaning
*

Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Richard A. Posner,
Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a previous draft.
1
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2
Of course there are other candidates. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Trust, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). It is important to note as well that the Court
embraced a particular species of originalism, one that emphasizes the “original public meaning”
rather than the “original intention.”
3
I do not mean to suggest that the Court was right. On the historical dispute, see below.
4
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
5
See, eg, ROBERT CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).

of the Constitution.6 On one view, Heller represents the full flowering of the approach
that Chief Justice Marshall imperfectly inaugurated—one that has been abandoned at
crucial periods in American history. To its defenders, Heller speaks honestly and
neutrally on behalf of the original meaning, and it should be appreciated and applauded
for that reason.7
But there is a radically different reading of Heller. The constitutional text is
ambiguous, and many historians believe that the Second Amendment does not, in fact,
create a right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes.8 In their view, the Court's reading is
untrue to the relevant materials. If they are right, then it is tempting to understand Heller
not as Marbury but as a modern incarnation of Lochner v. New York,9 in which the
Court overrode democratic judgments in favor of a dubious understanding of the
Constitution. On this view, it is no accident that the five-justice majority in Heller
consisted of the most conservative members of the Court (and were all Republican
appointees). Perhaps Heller is, in the relevant sense, a twenty-first century version of
Lochner-style substantive due process, and perhaps it marks the beginning of a long
series of confrontations between the Supreme Court and the political branches.
On a third view, this characterization badly misses the mark. Heller is more
properly characterized as a rerun of its minimalist ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut.10 In
Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives by
married couples, under circumstances in which the Connecticut law was plainly
inconsistent with a national consensus. The Court worked hard to support its decision by
reference to the standard legal materials,11 but the national consensus probably provides
the best explanation of what the Court did.12 Perhaps Heller is closely analogous. The
Court spoke confidently in terms of the original meaning, but perhaps its ruling is
impossible to understand without attending to contemporary values, and in particular to
the fact that the provisions that the Court invalidated were national outliers.
In this Comment, I contend that the third view is largely correct, and that Heller
will, in the fullness of time, be seen as embracing a kind of Second Amendment
6

5 U.S. at 173-80.
For an early statement to this effect, see Randy Barnett, Wall Street Journal (June 26, 2008).
8
See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Jack Rakove, The Second Amendment: The
Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI. KENT L. REV. 103, 158 (2001). See also the ambivalent
treatment, showing that there are plausible views on both sides, in MARK TUSHNET, OUT OF
RANGE (2007).
9
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11
Id. at 484-85.
12
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1994).
7
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minimalism. Notwithstanding the Court’s preoccupation with constitutional text and
history, Heller cannot be adequately understood as an effort to channel the document’s
original public meaning. The Court may have been wrong on that issue, and even if it was
right, a further question remains: Why was the robust individual right to possess guns
recognized in 2008, rather than 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, or 1998? And notwithstanding
the possible inclinations of the Court’s most conservative members, Heller is not best
seen as a descendent of Lochner. In spite of its radically different methodology, Heller is
far closer to Griswold than it is to Marbury or to Lochner.
No less than Griswold, Heller is a narrow rulings with strong minimalist features.
And if this view is right, then the development of the gun right, as it is specified over
time, will have close parallels to the development of the privacy right. As the law
emerges through case-by-case judgments, the scope of the right will have as much to do
with contemporary understandings as with historical ones. This point has general
implications for constitutional change in the United States, even when the Court
contends, in good faith, that it is merely channeling the original meaning or other
established sources of constitutional meaning.
II. Heller as Marbury
A.

Original Meaning and Blank Slates

For many years, Justice Scalia has contended that the Constitution should be
interpreted so as to fit with the original public meaning of the relevant provisions.13 In his
view, the judge’s duty is to track that meaning, not to take account of changing
circumstances or new moral commitments. What Justice Scalia seeks is a “solid, rockhard, unchanging” Constitution.14 His interest in originalism is explicitly connected with
his interest in rule-bound law and in constraining judicial discretion; on his account,
originalism is uniquely capable of ensuring that constitutional law is not a matter of
judicial will or ad hoc, case-by-case judgments.15 Indeed, originalism, and rule-bound
law, help to protect liberties by stiffening the judicial spine, ensuring respect for
constitutional rights even when the political pressure is intense.16 It is in part because of
his enthusiasm for rule-bound law that Justice Scalia rejects the “original intention” in
favor of the original meaning.17 To assess intentions, courts need to ask something
13

See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1994); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
14
Scalia, supra note, at
15
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
16
See id. at 1180. There is a clear connection between this claim and the Court’s rejection of
interest-balancing in Heller. See 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (responding to Justice Breyer).
17
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note, at
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subjective, involving what lies inside particular people’s heads; to ask about meaning,
courts can undertake a more objective inquiry.18
Notwithstanding the energy and clarity with which Justice Scalia has argued for
his approach, Heller is unique; he has never been able to embed originalism so explicitly
and directly in a majority opinion.19 On the contrary, originalism has not been a
significant theme on either the Rehnquist Court or the Roberts Court.20 For this reason, it
is stunning to see that Heller is a thoroughly originalist opinion—a significant
development, and one that is at least potentially important for the future, certainly of the
Second Amendment, and perhaps more generally.
To be sure, the Court’s originalism is less surprising here than it would be in other
domains. In the Second Amendment context, the Court had sparse precedents21 with
which to work; the cases were neither recent nor carefully reasoned, and it was clear that
the Court did not much like what it found.22 In a sense, the question in Heller was one of
first impression, or at least it could be so taken. In answering that question, many judges
might be drawn to the original understanding even if they would not consider it, or give it
a great deal of weight, if they were writing on an unclean slate.
But we should be careful about this point, for it is hardly inevitable that the Court
would be drawn to originalism even when it lacked doctrinal signposts. After all,
circumstances have changed dramatically since the ratification of the Second
Amendment, making it tempting to follow the text but not to the original meaning. The
twenty-first century United States is radically different from the eighteenth-century
United States, in a way that seems to complicate and perhaps even to confound any
formal of originalism.23 Compare the First Amendment: In approaching the meaning of
that amendment in the context of commercial advertising, the Court did not ask about the
original understanding, even though the precedents were sparse in that domain as well.24
In its first serious encounter with the question of affirmative action, the Court’s members

18

Id.
In some cases, however, there have been unmistakable originalist features. See, e.g., Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004). For a valuable discussion, see Stephanos Bibas,
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely
Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 201 (2005).
20
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939).
22
128 S. Ct. at 2814-15.
23
See Cornell, supra note; Rakove, supra note.
24
Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1978).
19
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spent essentially no time with the original meaning.25 The same is true with the pivotal
cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex.26 The Court’s decisions involving
sexually explicit materials were not originalist, even when the Court had few precedents
with which to work.27 Originalism seems to have more appeal when doctrine is not
developed, but the Court has not regularly spoken in originalist terms even when doctrine
barely exists.28
Moreover, judges who believe in some kind of “moral reading” of the
Consrtitution might attempt to make best moral sense of the relevant provision, rather
than to track the understandings of over two centuries ago.29 What is noteworthy is that
no opinion in Heller approached the constitutional question in these terms, at least not
explicitly. Justice Scalia’s thoroughly originalist opinion commanded a majority of the
Court, and Justice Scalia’s distinctive brand of originalism, involving the original public
meaning, was clearly ascendant. Indeed, the dissenters spoke in largely originalist terms
as well, although Justice Breyer’s plea for balancing had pragmatic as well as originalist
elements.30
B.

Marbury, Originalism, and Timing

Taken as a full-scale vindication of originalist methodology, Heller has few clear
precedents,31 even in the founding era.32 An imperfect but highly salient analogy is
Marbury.33 In recognizing the power of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall placed a

25

See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
27
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
28
For an illuminating discussion, see Adam Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date (unpublished
manuscript 2008).
29
See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1995).
30
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 – 53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Note that Stevens also emphasized
judicial precedents, see id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting), longstanding traditions, id. at 2842 –
45, and the need for judicial deference to reasonable legislative judgments. Id. at 2846 – 47 &
n.39.
31
But see note supra.
32
The Court’s clearest embrace of originalism, in its first century, occurs in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857): "It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice
or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the
political or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution.
The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can
obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning
when it was adopted." Note that in Dred Scott, the Court spoke in terms of original intentions, not
original public meaning.
33
For a illuminating discussion, with close reference to the context, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2006).
26
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great deal of emphasis on the constitutional text and structure.34 True, he did not speak
directly in terms of the original public meaning. But some of the foundations of his
approach were textualist,35 with his emphasis on the Supremacy Clause and the judicial
oath. Indeed, it would not be implausible to say that he was attempting to channel the
original understanding of the text. Some modern defenses of Marbury conclude that the
Court’s conclusion was indeed consistent with originalist methodology.36 Marbury could
easily have been written in originalist terms, and any such opinion would overlap with
Chief Justice Marshall’s own.
I do not mean to say anything controversial about Marbury here. But perhaps
Heller represents a far more through, careful, and sophisticated version of Marbury’s
approach—one that, well over two hundred years since the founding, attempts humbly
and faithfully to recover and to implement the original judgment of We the People.37 In
seeing Heller as Marbury, then, I am taking Marbury to be a reasonable rendering of that
original judgment, in a case that has unique salience in the canon of constitutional law.
This understanding of Heller is not at all implausible. The Court’s reading of text
and history was hardly preposterous38; whether or not the Court’s approach was
competent,39 it grappled with textual and historical arguments on all sides. But as a full
account of what the Court did, the understanding runs into two serious problems.40 The
first is that the original meaning of the Second Amendment is greatly contested and many
historians reject the Court’s conclusion—an issue to which I will shortly turn.
The second problem is less straightforward but equally fundamental: Even if the
Court’s understanding of the original public meaning is correct, why did the Court
vindicate that understanding in 2008? Why not in 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, or 1998?
Between 194241 and 2001,42 lower courts had been virtually unanimous in rejecting the
view that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to use guns for nonmilitary
34

5 U.S. at 180 “Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.”[quote]
35
Id.
36
See Clinton, supra note. For a very different understanding, see Ackerman, supra note.
37
For a brief suggestion to this effect, see Barnett, supra note.
38
See MARK TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE (2007) (suggesting that while the question is close, the
original understanding is best read to create an individual right to have guns).
39
For some doubts on that score from one of the leading historians of the founding period, see
Jack Rakove, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-historian.html
40
I put to one side some conceptual issues with attempting the originalist project under changed
circumstances. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES (2005).
41
Cases v. United States, 131 F2d 916 (1st Cir 1942).
42
U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir 2001).
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purposes. A quiz question: When was the first time a lower federal court invoked the
Second Amendment to invalidate a state or federal law? Answer: Heller itself, in 2007.43
In well over a half century, the Court has many opportunities to reject the established
view within the lower federal courts; it never did so. Indeed, no member of the Court, for
many decades, suggested an inclination to hold that the Second Amendment protects the
right to have a gun for nonmilitary uses. Why did the Court accept that view in 2008?
The answer has everything to do with the particular context in which the Heller
Court wrote—the context that led the Court to be composed as it was, and to have the
inclinations that it did. In terms of judicial as well as public convictions, it would be a
mistake to underrate the influence of a powerful and aggressive social movement in favor
of recognizing an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary purposes.44 In part as a
result of the immense influence of that movement, strong national majorities have come
to favor that right.45 Indeed, national opposition to a ban on handguns has been larger and
more consistent in recent years than in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.46 Politicians
of both parties strongly favor some kind of individual right to have guns, and the central
holding of Heller is thus fully consistent with the view of national leaders as well as that
of most citizens. It is revealing in this regard that both nominees for the presidency—
Barack Obama and John McCain—greeted Heller with general enthusiasm.47
Indeed, judicial rejection of an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary
purposes would have produced a high degree of public outrage, thus making the Court,
and its rejection of that right, a salient part of national politics. Any ruling against an
individual right to have guns for purposes of self-defense and hunting would have been
wildly unpopular. Such a ruling would have polarized the nation. By contrast, Heller
itself was met with widespread social approval. Far from creating a firestorm, it was
mostly met with reactions ranging from relative indifference to enthusiasm.

43

478 F.3d 370 (DC Cir 2007), affirmed, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
See Reva Siegel, Harv L Rev (forthcoming 2008).
45
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm; http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-BelievesAmericans-Right-Own-Guns.aspx
46
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27229/Gallup-Summary-Americans-Gun-Control.aspx
47
Senator McCain responded as follows: “Today's decision is a landmark victory for Second
Amendment freedom in the United States. . . . I applaud this decision as well as the overturning of
the District of Columbia's ban on handguns and limitations on the ability to use firearms for selfdefense.”
See
http://time-blog.com/real_clear_politics/2008/06/mccain_reacts_to_scotus_gun_de.html.
Senator Obama’s reaction was this: “I have always believed that the Second Amendment protects
the right of individuals to bear arms, . . . Today's ruling, the first clear statement on this issue in
127 years, will provide much-needed guidance to local jurisdictions across the country. As
President, I will uphold the constitutional rights of law-abiding gun-owners, hunters, and
sportsmen.” Id.
44
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Of course the Court does not merely channel public opinion, and hence it is
necessary to identify mechanisms that would link the Court’s recognition of a robust
individual right to a period in which most people support that right.48 It is surely relevant
here that the Court’s composition is determined by the views of the president (and,
through the power to advise and consent, the Congress), and the Republican presidents
who appointed the five-member Heller majority were strong supporters of a broad
Second Amendment right.49 The fact that in 2008, the Court was willing to read the
Constitution so as to safeguard that right had everything to do with the social and
political context in which the Court wrote.
In short, I am suggesting that even if Heller accurately captured the original
meaning, the Court’s willingness to do so cannot be explained in terms that point only to
historical accuracy. In any number of areas—affirmative action, sex equality, property
rights, commercial advertising—the Court could choose, but has not chosen, to be
originalist. We also need to ask: Why originalism now, in particular? Why originalism
here, in particular? The most sensible answers point to context and culture, and both of
these strongly favored the Court’s conclusion.
III.

Heller as Lochner

In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a maximum hour law.50 The
Court reasoned that freedom of contract is part of the “liberty” protected by the due
process clause, and it found that the state’s police power did not extend to maximum hour
regulation, which could not be justified as either a labor law or a health law.51 In so
ruling, the Court attempted, in good faith, to justify its conclusion by reference to the
standard legal materials.52 There is no reason to doubt that the Court’s members
genuinely believed that the legal sources justified their conclusion. But it is now widely
agreed that Lochner was a mistake and even a disgrace, because the Court could not
claim adequate legal support for its conclusion and actually entrenched its own,
controversial view of public policy.53 The general problem with the Lochner decision,
thus understood, is captured in Justice Holmes’ dissenting suggestion that “the
Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”54 After Heller, does
48

For one account, see EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3-6 (1949).
See views of Reagan; views of George H.W. Bush; views of George W. Bush.
50
198 U.S. at 64.
51
Id. at 57-58.
52
Id. at 54-56.
53
For the Court’s own recognition of this point, see, e.g., Ferguson v. Scrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963). For one discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1975)
(criticizing Lochner for taking position on competing questions of policy).
54
198 U.S. at 75. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49
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the Constitution enact the latest position paper of the National Rifle Association? The
conclusions of the Republican party on gun control?
At first glance, it seems reckless to ask such questions or to see Heller as a
modern incarnation of Lochner, because the Court took such pains to attempt to justify its
approach by reference to constitutional text, structure and history. To know whether it is
plausible to see Heller as Lochner, we need to know what the claim of analogy is meant
to assert.55 On one view, which should be congenial to those who approve of Heller, the
vice of Lochner consisted in a departure from the original meaning of the relevant text.
On another, different view, the vice of Lochner consisted in invalidation of a statute when
the constitutional text was ambiguous. Of course there are other possibilities, most
prominently the view that the vice of Lochner consisted in an aggressive judicial posture
in a context in which there was no particular reason to think that the democratic process
was malfunctioning.
A.

Originalism and Lochnerism

The Heller Court purported to be originalist, but many historians have concluded
and even insisted that the Second Amendment does not create an individual right to use
guns for nonmilitary purposes. On this view, the understanding enshrined in Heller is a
product of the nation’s most recent decades, not the founding period.
In one of the most elaborate and detailed studies, Saul Cornell concludes that the
Second Amendment right does not extend to nonmilitary uses of guns.56 He finds, for
example, that the right did not cover the use of guns for purposes of hunting; in his
account, the suggestion that it did cover such use was expressed on only one isolated
occasion in the founding era, and even that reference, in a dissent in the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, was obscure.57 More generally, Cornell concludes that the
“original understanding of the Second Amendment was neither an individual right of selfdefense nor a collective right of the states, but rather a civic right that guaranteed that
citizens would be able to keep and bear those arms needed to meet their obligation to
participate in a well-regulated militia.”58 In Cornell’s view, the understanding endorsed in
55

There are many different accounts of the vice of Lochner; I emphasize conventional ones here.
For discussion of what might be wrong with Lochner, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 84
COLUM. L. REV. (1984); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373
(2003).
56
SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS
OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006).
57
Id. at
58
Cornell, supra note.
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Heller is simply wrong; the Second Amendment, as originally understood, did not create
a right to have guns for nonmilitary purposes.
Similarly, Jack Rakove, one of the most careful students of the period, concludes
that the purpose of the Second Amendment was merely to affirm “the essential
proposition—or commonplace—that liberty fared better when republican polities relied
upon a militia of citizen-soldiers for their defense, rather than risk the dire consequences
of sustaining a permanent military establishment.”59 Rakove believes that the Second
Amendment must be understood in the context of the effort to preserve state militias; he
rejects a broader understanding of the right created by the amendment. Rakove flatly
rejects the position adopted by the Court in Heller.60
In his dissenting opinion in Heller, Justice Stevens outlines the narrower reading of
the Second Amendment, focused on military uses of firearms, in considerable detail and
with detailed references to the primary and secondary material.61 The much more
important point is that many historians believe that he is right. The Heller Court itself
relied on numerous academic writings by law professors,62 but few members of that
group are trained historians. More commonly, they are advocates with a rooting interest
in one or another position. There is a marked difference (in my view) between the care,
sensitivity to context, and relative neutrality generally shown by historians and advocacyoriented, conclusion-driven, and sometimes tendentious treatments characteristic of
academic lawyers on both sides of the Second Amendment debate. As Rakove writes,
“historical operations in the Second Amendment theater of combat are often mounted by
campaigners not intimately familiar with the terrain. These are raiders who know what
they are looking for, and having found it, they care little about collateral damage to the
surrounding countryside that historians better know as context.”63 Law-office history
plays a large role in the law reviews and, thanks to Heller, on the pages of the United
States Reports. Notwithstanding the impressive detail of the competing arguments by the
Court and Justice Stevens, the subtlety, nuance, acknowledgement of counterarguments,
and (above all) immersion in founding era debates, characteristic of good historical work,
cannot be found in Heller.

59

Jack Rakove, The Second Amendment: the Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI. KENT L. REV.
103, 158 (2001). In the process of supporting this argument, Rakove offers a sharp challenge to
influential work by academic lawyers. See id. at 156-159.
60
Id.; see also Brief (Rakove’s), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-290_PetitionerAmCuRakove.pdf;
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-historian.html;
http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/qa-jack-rakove-on-heller-and-history/.
61
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831-42.
62
See id. at 2789, 2795, 2798-99, 2803, 2820, 2848-49, 2866.
63
Rakove, supra note, at 105.
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This should not be a surprise. No member of the Court is a historian. None can
claim to be anything like a true specialist in the founding period.64 In these
circumstances, it is more than a little disturbing to find that the most conservative
members of the Court concluded, apparently with great confidence, that the Second
Amendment creates a robust individual right, whereas the less conservative members of
the Court concluded, apparently with equal confidence, that the Second Amendment does
no such thing. In these circumstances, Heller is plausibly taken as a great triumph less for
historical recovery than for a social movement determined to create a robust right to use
guns.65
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the analogy to Lochner is highly
imperfect, at least if we see Lochner as a case that was wrong because it so plainly defied
the original meaning. The Lochner Court did not take pains to defend its decision in
textual and historical terms terms, and it is most doubtful that the decision could be so
defended. By contrast, Heller offers ample detail on the original meaning, and Heller
could be so defended, notwithstanding the existence of intense debate. For this reason,
the analogy to Lochner seems to fail if we understand the analogy to be based on a
judgment that the twentieth century Court flagrantly departed from originalist
methodology, properly applied.
B.

Thayerism and Lochnerism

It is not standard, howevr, to say that the flaw of Lochner was that it departed
from originalism. Let us understand Lochner in a different way, one that emphasizes the
analysis in one of the greatest and most influential essays in the history of American law,
(and one that has received a prominent and powerful modern defense66). In that essay,
James Bradley Thayer argued that courts should uphold national legislation unless it is
plainly and unambiguously in violation of the Constitution.67 Thayer noted that because
the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who decide on its meaning must
inevitably exercise discretion. Laws that “will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; . . . the constitution often admits of
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different interpretations; . . . there is often a range of choice and judgement.”68 In
Thayer’s view, “whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”69
Thayer’s argument, in brief, was that courts should strike down laws only “when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”70 The question for
courts “is not one of the mere and simple preponderance of reasons for or against, but of
what is very plain and clear, clear beyond a reasonable doubt.”71 In so arguing, Thayer
emphasized two points. The first is the fallibility of federal judges. When judges
conclude that a law is unconstitutional, they are of course relying on their own
interpretation, and they might be wrong. Judges are learned in the law, certainly. But
should we conclude that judicial interpretations are necessarily correct?
Thayer’s second point was that a strong judiciary might harm democracy itself.
He feared that if judges become too aggressive, the moral responsibilities of elected
officials might weaken. Thayer lamented that “our doctrine of constitutional law has had
a tendency to drive out questions of justice and right, and to fill the minds of legislators
with thoughts of mere legality, of what the constitution allows.”72 Indeed things have
often been worse, for “even in the matter of legality, they have felt little responsibility; if
we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it.”73 Thayer sought to place the
responsibility for justice on democracy, where it belongs. “Under no system can the
power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere.”74
Modern Thayerians might well emphasize this point in the context of the Second
Amendment as elsewhere, suggesting that regulation of guns raises complex moral and
pragmatic considerations, and these should be engaged directly, and not as a matter of
“mere legality.”
On a Thayerian view, the problem with the Lochner decision was that the Court
invalidated legislation even though the constitutional infirmity was far from plain. On
this view, Heller runs exactly into the same problem. We have seen that reasonable
people, including reasonable historians, fiercely debate the meaning of the Second
Amendment and that the view defended by Justice Stevens—that the right extends only
to military uses of guns—is hardly without support. In these circumstances, Thayerians
will insist that the Court owed a duty of respect to a democratic judgment.
68
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C.

Guns, Carolene Products, and Politics

It is true that the Thayerian reading of Lochner cuts very broadly, and, for most
observers, unacceptably so. If Thayer was right, Heller is surely wrong, but the same
must be said about many other decisions accepted by most of Heller’s likely critics,
including (for example) Brown v. Board of Education (banning racial segregation),75
Califano v. Goldfarb (striking down sex discrimination),76 and Boumediene (vindicating
right to habeas corpus).77 Almost no one is a universal Thayerian.78 If Heller is to be
treated as a modern incarnation of Lochner for less-than-universal Thayerians, then we
must specify a less-than-universal domain for Thayerism, one that would reject both
decisions, but allow a more aggressive judicial approach in many areas. In the most
famous footnote in all of constitutional law in Carolene Products, the Court suggested
such a possibility, indicating a more aggressive approach would be justified when there
was some kind of defect in majoritarian processes.79 John Hart Ely’s Democracy and
Distrust80 elaborates an approach of this kind, which is supported by an illuminating
footnote from Justice Stevens as well.81
On this view, the Thayerian view is generally correct, but a more intrusive
approach from the Court is justified (only) when the democratic process is not
functionally well, in the sense that certain rights and groups are at particular risk. Perhaps
an aggressive approach can be justified in (for example) sorting out ambiguities in the
Equal Protection Clause in Brown, but not in sorting out ambiguities in the Second
Amendment in Heller. There is no special reason for an aggressive judicial role in
75
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protecting against gun control, in light of the fact that opponents of such control have
considerable political power, and do not seem to be at a systematic disadvantage in the
democratic process. The Carolene Products approach offers no support for Heller.
Indeed, the widespread commitment to an individual right to own guns itself operates as a
safeguard against excessive or unjustified gun control laws.
The Carolene Products approach is of course controversial, especially to those
who favor the originalist methodology of Heller. To those who embrace originalism,
judges must follow that methodology, and considerations involving deference to the
democratic process, or its limits, are irrelevant. At this point we seem to have reached a
dead end. On some accounts of what was wrong with Lochner, Heller is analogous. The
question is whether those accounts are the right ones.
IV.

Heller as Griswold

In Griswold, the Court protected an individual right that enjoyed broad popular
support, at the expense of a law that counted as a national outlier. In Heller, the Court did
the same thing. In Griswold, the Court proceeded in minimalist fashion, with its holding
focusing narrowly on the law before it. The same is true of the Court’s approach in
Heller. Just as Griswold reflected a kind of privacy minimalism, Heller signals the
likelihood of Second Amendment minimalism. These conclusions have strong
implications for the future development of Second Amendment doctrine.
A.

Rationalizing Griswold

In Griswold, the Court struck down Connecticut’s ban on the use of
contraceptives by married couples.82 The Court struggled mightily to find a textual source
for its conclusion. It explored a range of provisions that might be seen to protect some
kind of “privacy,”83 and it urged that the right to use contraceptives falls within
“penumbras” or “emanations” from the Bill of Rights.84 But constitutional provisions
have domains, not “penumbras” or “emanations,” and hence almost no one defends
Griswold as originally written. It is an understatement to say that Court’s analysis has not
survived the test of time.85
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Three other rationales for Griswold have received respectful attention. The first,
pressed by Alexander Bickel, emphasizes desuetude.86 The Connecticut law at issue was
enacted long before the Court’s decision; it was not much enforced; and under these
circumstances, it might be taken to have “lapsed.” To be sure, a great deal of work must
be done to show how this idea can be made to justify Griswold on constitutional grounds;
no constitutional provision declares statutes invalid because they are infrequently
enforced, anachronistic, or both.87 But perhaps the Due Process Clause, in its purely
procedural sense, is sufficient. Perhaps it could be said that a law violates that clause if it
is so wildly out of step with prevailing social norms that its enforcement is necessarily
sporadic and therefore unpredictable, in a way that compromises the rule of law.88
The second rationale, pressed by Justice Harlan, emphasizes the grounding of
substantive due process in tradition.89 Perhaps the sanctity of marriage is honored by
tradition, and perhaps the tradition, which should not be taken as static, is fatally
inconsistent with the Connecticut law.90 On this view, substantive due process is rooted
in longstanding social understandings, and the tradition of respect for marital privacy
requires a powerful justification for any intrusion. The underlying claim might be that
courts should not be licensed to define “liberty” as they see fit, and that if a certain
conception of liberty is sanctified by tradition, it has a kind of epistemic credential.91
A third rationale, pressed by Judge Richard Posner, is that the Connecticut law
was fatally out of step with the national consensus.92 On this view, the Griswold Court
was acting to vindicate that consensus against an outlier. Here too, of course, a great deal
of work would be necessary to demonstrate why and when the Due Process Clause
should be construed to give authority to a national consensus, or to raise serious doubts
about national outliers. Perhaps the basic claim is that if a law is a genuinely outlier, there
is reason to doubt whether it is grounded on a firm foundation; an intrusion on liberty that
lacks anything like broad support might lack epistemic credentials, simply because and to
the extent that it is so unusual. On this view, Judge Posner’s approach is a close cousin of
Justice Harlan’s.
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The Court itself has often rooted its analysis in Justice Harlan’s approach,93 but
Judge Posner’s understanding of Griswold fits well with a broader fact about the arc of
constitutional law. The Court rarely speaks in terms of insistence on a national consensus,
or even in terms of responsiveness to what most people think. But the development of
doctrine, over time, unquestionably shows that kind of responsiveness.94 As a clear
example, very much in line with this understanding of Griswold, consider Lawrence v.
Texas.95 In that case, the Court was even willing to invoke “an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex” in invalidating a ban on same-sex sexual
relations.96 But both historians97 and political scientists98 have shown that the connection
between judicial rulings and public convictions is far more pervasive. Consider Brown v.
Bd. of Education,99 invalidating racial segregation; Loving v. Virginia,100 striking down
bans on racial intermarriage; Reed v. Reed,101 inaugurating the constitutional attack on
laws discriminating on the basis of sex; Craig v. Boren102 and United States v.
Virginia,103 cementing the ban on such laws; and Romer v. Evans,104 striking down a
highly usual Colorado law discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. In these
cases, and many more, it would be reasonable to suggest that the Court’s decision was, in
an important sense, insisting that states must obey a national consensus.
It is easy to see Heller in the same light. As I have noted, a strong majority of
Americans now supports the individual right to own guns for nonmilitary purposes.105 At
the same time, the law at issue in Heller was among the most draconian in the nation—a
genuine national outlier.106 The Heller Court might be understood as reacting to the D.C.
law in the same way that the Griswold Court reacted to the Connecticut law, with
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skepticism about an intrusion that departs so radically from the general practice and
hence the national consensus.107 Recall here that both presidential candidates—John
McCain and Barack Obama—responded to the Heller decision with statements reflecting
their support for the Court’s conclusion.108
To be sure, there are significant differences between the Connecticut law at issue
in Griswold and the District of Columbia law at issue in Heller. The Connecticut
provision was old, making the claim of desuetude plausible,109 and the Griswold Court
could even have been said to have engaged in a project of “modernization,” in a way that
fits with some general tendencies in constitutional law.110 By contrast, the District of
Columbia provision was new, suggesting that the Court was not merely vindicating a
national judgment but also challenging a departure from standard understandings of
appropriate gun control legislation. A doctrine that would authorize an attack on
anachronistic laws raises quite different considerations from a doctrine that would
authorize a challenge to recent departures and innovations. In this respect, Bickel’s
understanding of Griswold offers no help in Heller. What I am suggesting is a more
general point: Heller is quite similar to Griswold in the critical sense that both decisions
operate in accordance with a national consensus at the expense of a law that counted as a
sharp deviation from it.
It is also true that the District of Columbia law at issue in Heller could have been
overridden by Congress at any time, unlike most state enactments. If Congress enacts a
law that intrudes on privacy, or that regulates guns, it would be singularly odd to
invalidate that law as a “national outlier.” But there is a large difference between a
national enactment from Congress and an enactment governing the District of Columbia.
The latter enactments reflect political pressures and dynamics that are not genuinely
national but that reveal the distinctive pressures and concerns that produce outcomes for
the District. When Congress fails to override the law of the District, its inaction cannot
plausibly be taken as a reflection of national will. In these circumstances, it is perfectly
legitimate to treat legislation for the District as a kind of state law, and to conclude that
for better or for worse, it may indeed count as a national outlier.

107

There is of course an objection to this position, invoking federalism and the legitimacy of
differences across states; I will turn to this objection in due course. See infra.
108
See note supra.
109
See also Lawrence, 543 U.S. at 568-70.
110
See David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement, 57 STAN. L. REV.
761 (2004).

17

B.

Question and Puzzles

Of course this understanding of the Court’s role raises many questions and
doubts. The first is empirical: What mechanisms link constitutional doctrine to a national
consensus? The most obvious answer points to the appointments process. That process
ensures that the views of the justices have some connection to political will. But as we
have seen, there is a further point. Justices lives in society, and they are inevitably
influenced by what other people in society think.111 While judicial rulings are hardly a
direct product of public opinion, there are clear links between what justices do and what
the public thinks.112 Notwithstanding the Court’s emphasis on what it took to be the
original understanding, Heller is a clear example.
There are also normative questions: Why does a national consensus matter? Why
is it relevant to the due process clause, the Second Amendment, or anything else? Why
and when should the Court strike down national outliers, rather than permitting them as a
form of legitimate and even desirable experimentation? As I have suggested, the
consensus may have epistemic value; if most people believe that X is true, X is may well
be true, at least under favorable conditions. At least it might be said that if a national
consensus supports some kind of individual right to own guns, the risks associated with
recognition of that right are not likely to be terribly high. For purposes of law, the
relevance of this point depends on the appropriate theory of constitutional
interpretation.113 Originalists will be puzzled about the idea that a national consensus
matters unless the original understanding suggests that it does.
There are also legitimate questions about federalism, experimentation, and
divergent norms. Certainly national outliers cannot be said to be invalid as such. If the
District of Columbia seeks to embark on a path that differs from that of Montana and
Georgia, or for that matter that is unique or nearly so, should we not acknowledge the
possibility (likelihood!) that it is responding to the distinctive values and information of
its own citizens and representatives, in a way that deserves respect? Today’s outlier is
tomorrow’s norm. But prominent theories of interpretation do make a place for public
will, most plausibly on the theory that at least in some domains, widespread social
convictions convey information about the proper content of rights.114 Indeed, judicial
reliance on such convictions might even be counted as a form of “popular
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constitutionalism.”115 Both Griswold and Heller (and Brown, and Lawrence, and Reed v.
Reed, among many others) can be seen as reflections of popular constitutionalism, even if
the Heller Court hardly spoke in those terms.
Even if so, a related problem remains: Could the Court have defended its opinion
in the terms sketched here? Could it have done so in Griswold? Surely it is revealing that
the Court did not attempt to do so in either case—and that it is unusual for the Court to
acknowledge the relevance of the national consensus.116 Suppose that we accept the
publicity principle, in accordance with which public institutions should not root their
judgments in considerations that they could not defend in public.117 If so, the Court ought
not to resolve cases by reference to arguments that it could not justify publicly. The only
possible response to this objection is that in at least some variation, the approach I am
sketching could indeed be offered by the Court.118 Indeed, I am willing to predict that in
some domains, it will be offered in the future. And even when a national consensus is not
explicitly invoked, it is often at work.
There is an important historical difference to be pondered as well. Heller is the
product of a mature current of constitutional thought, spurred by private groups but also
by committed academics, that had clearly become prominent in nationwide politics and
culture and that, by 2008, had established itself as thoroughly mainstream.119 In sharp
contrast, Griswold was the result of an early effort by an incipient movement for
reproductive rights and sex equality that had yet to become highly visible on the nation's
cultural viewscreen.120 In this sense, Heller has far more in common with Brown v. Board
of Education than with Griswold—in the particular sense that Brown, like Heller, was the
culmination of a long process of advocacy, in a self-conscious effort to entrench a certain
understanding of the Constitution in the interest of social reform.121 In short, Heller and
Griswold have distinctive sociologies. While the two are both responsive to public
convictions, the cultural backdrop for the two decisions was radically different.
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Finally, there is a question about judicial competence: How will the Court identify
the national consensus, if it is relevant? Ought the justices to consult opinion polls? To
survey state law? I cannot answer such questions here. The goal is to understand Heller,
not to defend it. My principal suggestion is that in its vindication of national
commitments against a provision that starkly departed from it, Heller is closely analogous
to Griswold.
C.

Heller’s Minimalism

Griswold was a conspicuously minimalist opinion.122 Despite the breadth of its
rhetoric, the Court narrowly focused on the particular provision at issue. The decision
focused on the right to use contraceptives within marriage. The Court did not resolve or
even speak to the question whether there is a right to purchase contraceptives within
marriage; whether any right to use or purchase contraceptives applies outside of
marriage; and whether any such right is part of a right to sexual activity as such. And
notwithstanding its apparent sweep, the Heller Court’s opinion has unmistakable
minimalist elements. To be sure, the opinion displays a high degree of theoretical depth;
with its originalist path, the Court did not seek an incompletely theorized agreement on
its approach.123 But the Court focused the key parts of its analysis on the particular
provisions at issue.124
Most obviously, the Court suggested that the Second Amendment right has clear
limitations. In the Court’s words, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.”125 To this the Court added that “the sorts of weapons protected were those
‘in common use at the time.’”126 In its view, “that limitation is fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” 127 It
follows that certain unusual or especially dangerous weapons, such as sawed-off
shotguns, would be outside of the domain of the Second Amendment. In these ways, the
Court specified the validity of a number of actual or imaginable limitations on the right.
To be sure, these disclaimers are not, precisely, a form of minimalism; they do not
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leave the nature of the right unclear. They trim, rather than refusing to decide.128 But the
Court acknowledged that its decision was, in some respects, quite narrow and that much
remains to be resolved. After offering an account of measures on which it did not mean
to cast doubt, the Court added an important footnote: “We identify these presumptively
lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.”129 In addition, the Court was sensitive to Justice Breyer’s objection that its
ruling left a great deal open: “[S]ince this case represents the Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire
field.”130 To support this point, the Court referred to its first decision involving religious
liberty, Reynolds v. United States, acknowledging, with understatement and perhaps a
degree of irony, that the Court’s ruling there did not “leave that area in a state of utter
certainty.”131
Notwithstanding the Court’s emphasis on historical markers, it is emphatically true
that Heller leaves many questions open. To be sure, the Court squarely rejected case-bycase interest-balancing, urged by Justice Breyer.132 But consider three fundamental issues
that the Court did not resolve. (a) The Court did not decide whether the Second
Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus made applicable to
the states.133 (b) The Court did not settle on a level of scrutiny for limitations on the
Second Amendment right.134 (c) The Court did not come close to specifying the scope of
the right. We know that “dangerous and unusual weapons” can be forbidden, and that this
idea undergirds the conclusion that “the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in
common use at the time.’” But how, precisely, does this idea bear on modern questions,
especially in light of the fact that weapons are necessarily modern ones? The Court’s
answer here is opaque: “And there will be time enough to expound upon the historical
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned when and if those exceptions come
before us.”135 Rejecting interest-balancing, the Court did say that the Second Amendment
“elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
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arms in defense of hearth and home.”136 But what, exactly does that abstract phrase
mean? How will it be specified in the future? The Court did not say.
D.

Evaluating Heller as Griswold

We have seen that on purely originalist grounds, the question resolved in Heller
was not straightforward, and reasonable people believe that the Court was wrong.137 In
these circumstances, the Court might have used two tiebreakers. First, it might have
emphasized the importance of respecting longstanding practices by federal and state
legislatures and by federal courts, which seemed to suggest that the Second Amendment
right is limited to military uses of guns. That understanding of the amendment was
unambiguously reflected in numerous lower federal court decisions, so much so as to
represent an entrenched view.138 The same view seemed to fit with many legislative
practices as well.139 For followers of Edmund Burke, who believe less in the original
meaning that in the need to follow social understandings over time,140 the legislative and
judicial practices might well have been invoked to reject a right to use guns for
nonmilitary purposes.
Second, the Court might have concluded that for Thayerian reasons, the Court
should have allowed the democratic process room to maneuever, at least in the face of
reasonable doubt. Without any particular democratic malfunction, specially justifying
judicial intervention, and without any kind of claim on the basis of Carolene Products, a
Thayerian approach had considerable appeal. Such an approach receives additional
support from the fact that Heller will inevitably require federal courts, with limited
guidance from Heller itself, to play an exceedingly difficult role in assessing the
predictably numerous challenges to gun control legislation. Perhaps the Court should
have adopted a narrower interpretation of the Second Amendment that was, at the least,
textually and historically plausible, and that would prevent the federal judiciary from
entering an unusual political thicket in which the democratic process does not seem to be
working poorly.
There is, however, an important countervailing consideration. For the last
decades, and perhaps for much longer, a robust individual right to use guns has become
an entrenched part of American culture.141 Many Americans believe that this right is both
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fundamental and essential—as much so, in its way, as the right to freedom of speech.
They believe that the right to have guns is a crucial safeguard against private threats and
even against government itself. Gun ownership is, for them, the ultimate form of
security—an essential part of their identity and self-understanding.142 About forty million
Americans—more than one in eight—are gun owners.143 In these circumstances, it is no
light thing for the Supreme Court to announce that tens of millions of Americans are
simply mistaken, and that they hold their guns only at the government’s sufferance.
Of course it is legitimate to ask whether this consideration is important or even
relevant. Should the Supreme Court interpret the Constitution to create rights simply
because people understand the Constitution to create rights—and would be offended or
worse if the Court failed to do so? After all, the Court did not recognize a right to social
security benefits144 or to obscene materials145 or to certain kinds of property protection,146
even though millions of Americans insist, with great conviction, that they have such
rights. But the right to have guns is different. It has a unique status in contemporary
American culture; it has been recognized as such, and with great intensity, by citizens and
politicians of both parties. An interpretation of the founding document that denied the
right would likely create a kind of public outrage, political polarization, and social
disruption, that has not been seen in many decades. Out of respect for the intensely felt
convictions of millions of Americans, and with concern for the risks associated with that
disruption, perhaps the Court should hesitate before denying the right.
In these circumstances, Heller starts to look even more like Griswold; recall that
the latter case involved the right to marital intimacy, which (not to put too fine a point on
it) is also understood to be fundamental by millions of Americans. In many ways, Heller
is even more defensible than Griswold on the ground I am exploring. As I have
emphasized, it is certainly true that the Court did not write in these terms, and it would be
speculative in the extreme to suggest that any member of the Court even thought about
the Second Amendment question in this way. I am not contending that the explanation I
am offering is, in the end, sufficient. In the end, however, I believe that that explanation
provides the strongest basis for understanding what made Heller possible—and it also
offers a ground for seeing what makes Heller appealing.
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E.

A Note on Implications

What might be expected for the future? The three analogies offer competing
answers. If Marbury, understood in originalist terms, provides the right analogy, then we
should expect courts to follow an emphatically historicist course, in which the goal of
judges, acting as amateur historians, is to transplant the original understanding to modern
problems. This approach is consistent with the thrust of Heller itself, but it presents
serious conceptual problems,147 and it is possible that the originalist inquiries will mask
judgments that have a pragmatic component and that are driven by a sense of
consequences and justifications. The more general point is that if Marbury, as understood
here, is the analogy, the text, understood in light of the history, will be the actual as well
as articulated foundation for future decisions, and the scope of the Second Amendment
right will turn on history.
If Heller is to be a rerun of Lochner, then we should expect serious and continuing
conflicts between the Court and the political process, with a series of politically
controversial invalidations.148 If the Court does not track but instead defies popular
convictions, the Lochner analogy will be closer. To be sure, it is not imaginable that the
Second Amendment would be taken to create the same kinds of obstacles to democratic
initiatives as did the due process clause in the Lochner era, if only because the scope of
the Second Amendment is so much more limited. But it is at least imaginable that judicial
invalidations of gun control laws will be frequent in the next decade and more.
If the analogy to Griswold holds, the path of the Second Amendment right will be
similar to the path of the privacy right. Despite the Heller Court’s emphatic rejection of
interest-balancing, we should expect a long series of case-by-case judgments, highly
sensitive to particulars. The law will follow a minimalist path. Many judges will speak in
originalist terms, but contemporary reason and sense, as the judges understand them, will
pay crucial roles. If Heller is analogous to Griswold, the Court will not use the Second
Amendment aggressively as a basis for striking down many gun control laws. Instead it
will proceed cautiously, upholding most of the laws now on the books and invalidating
only the most draconian limitations. It is very early, to be sure, but thus far, the lower
courts are taking exactly this path.149
It should go without saying that as with the right to privacy, judicial appointments
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will be crucial. After all, if Bush v. Gore150 had been decided differently, it is most likely
that District of Columbia v. Heller would have been decided differently as well.151
IV.

Conclusion

Heller is the most explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history
of the Supreme Court. Taken at face value, its oldest salient precursor seems to be
Marbury, in which the Court also rested its decision on constitutional text and structure. I
do not believe, however, that Heller can be adequately understood in this way. The
relevant materials are ambiguous rather than clear; no member of the Court is a trained
historian, and much of its opinion sounds like advocacy, or law-office history152; in the
historical debate, the Heller opinion might have been wrong. In any event, it remains
necessary to explain what made it possible for Heller to be issued in 2008, when it would
not have been imaginable in 1958, 1968, 1978, or even 1988.
Skeptics will be tempted to see Heller as a triumph of politics and a defeat for
law. On their view, the Court’s detailed exploration of text and history is a smokescreen
for a position that has been pressed hard by interest groups and political activists, that the
Republican Party enthusiastically endorses, and that Republican appointees are likely to
find congenial. If this view is correct, the most salient precursor is not Marbury but
Lochner. This view can claim support from the fact that the Court was split along
ideological lines; it was the most conservative members of the Court accepted the robust
understanding of the Second Amendment right. But purely on the original understanding,
Heller stands on plausible grounds—far more so than did Lochner. The Court did not,
and could not, defend the invalidation of maximum hour laws by reference to text,
structure, and history. At the very least, the Heller Court made a sustained effort to do so.
If the flaw of Lochner consists in the Court’s invocation of ambiguous constitutional text
to strike down legislation, then Heller is indeed close to Lochner. But few people believe
that it is always illegitimate for the Court to strike down legislation when and because the
relevant provision of the Constitution is ambiguous. For those believe in a democracyreinforcing approach to judicial review, Lochner and Heller will seem closely analogous.
At first glance, it is jarring to suggest that Heller is a modern counterpart to
Griswold. The two decisions seem to come from different jurisprudential universes. In
originalist terms, there is nothing like a simple or clear defense of Griswold, and it would
150
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not be possible to produce a Heller-style opinion on its behalf. Nonetheless, the two
rulings have a great deal in common. Both were made possible by a national consensus,
which they simultaneously reflected. Both struck down a law that amounted to a national
outlier. Despite their sweeping rhetoric, both had important minimalist features, ensuring
that the content of the relevant right will be specified over time. It is clear that as it has
developed, the right to privacy has had a great deal to do with contemporary convictions,
not with the judgments of those long dead. Notwithstanding Heller’s barely qualified
originalism,153 I believe that the same will prove true of the right to bear arms. We have
entered a period of Second Amendment minimalism.
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